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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

PAY-AS-YOU-GO ELECTRICITY:
THE IMPACT OF PREPAY PROGRAMS ON ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION

Prepay or pay-as-you-go programs are an increasingly popular type of rate plan offered by
electric utilities. Under these plans, ratepayers must keep a positive balance at all times to avoid
being automatically disconnected, they are charged daily for their usage, and they are provided
with a means to monitor their consumption. One of the suggested benefits of these plans is that
they allow electricity consumers to better manage their usage. Using household level monthly
usage data from customers enrolled in prepay programs at two Kentucky rural electric
cooperatives, we investigate whether there is a change in consumption after these customers
enrolled in the program. To address this question, we employ a fixed-effects model. The results
of our model indicate that prepay customers reduce their consumption by an average of 11% after
enrolling in the program. We also find that this response is larger during periods of high or low
temperatures than during mild weather. Furthermore, we find evidence that the prepayment
effect diminishes over the length of time that a customer is enrolled in the program.
KEYWORDS: Electricity, prepay, billing method, feedback, fixed-effects, bounded rationality
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Household energy demand has been an important topic of interest within the field of economics
for decades. In the 1970s, the backdrop was the oil embargo and the need to conserve energy to reduce
dependence on foreign oil (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005). Today, the focus is still on
conservation, but the main motivating factors have changed. While there are still concerns about resource
scarcity and national security, climate change and environmental regulations have renewed interests in
modeling household energy demand. The end goal of these studies is often to determine methods to that
can enable or encourage households to reduce their energy consumption. It is increasingly understood
that behavioral psychology needs to be incorporated into how one understands energy demand. An oftenignored aspect this part of the literature, however, is how the billing method can impact that behavior.
Most U.S. households receive a bill at the end of the month that tells them how much electricity
they have consumed and how much they owe for that electricity. Prepay or pay-as-you-go rate structures
are increasingly seen as an attractive alternative to this traditional postpay method. Unlike monthly
billing, prepay customers pay in advance and they are continuously notified of their electricity use. Even
though the rate one pays for electricity does not change with the new billing method, many argue that
prepay plans cause consumers to use less electricity (Carter & Claywell, 2014; Day & Slobada, 2013;
Lakes, 2014; McCoun, 2014; Ozog, 2013; R.W. Beck, 2009). The effect is typically attributed to the idea
that customers become more aware of their electricity consumption after enrolling in prepay plans.
The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, we develop a theoretical framework that attempts
to explain why prepay rates might alter electricity consumption. We then use a sample of household
electricity consumption data to empirically investigate this relationship. Based on previous work that
looks at the importance of feedback on one’s electricity consumption behavior, we hypothesize that the
households in our sample will show a significant reduction in usage after enrolling into a prepay plan.
Our sample data are from two rural electric cooperative corporations (RECCs) in central and
eastern Kentucky. The data is limited in the sense that it contains no household-level characteristics, such
as size of residence or type of heating used. This necessitates that we do an ex-post analysis on
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households that switch from postpay to prepay as opposed to comparing the prepay sample to the postpay
sample. The fixed effects model employed in this analysis captures many of the determinants of
electricity consumption in the fixed effect error term. It allows us to focus on the change in billing
method, our variable of interest. This paper contributes to the literature because it uses a unique data set
for the empirical analysis, and it is the first study to propose a theoretical framework for how billing
method can impact consumption.
The literature identifies numerous factors that determine household electricity consumption. This
study does not attempt to catalog all of those factors, nor does it attempt to replace their significance. The
goal of this paper is to add to the literature by identifying an additional behavioral factor that could impact
household electricity consumption. This kind of information is of increasing relevance to energy system
modelers who can use this improved understanding of consumer behavior to help build better bottom-up
energy system models.
There are important practical implications to determining whether the billing method used can
impact one’s electricity consumption. Policy makers could theoretically use prepay plans as a low-cost
means to lower residential consumption, reducing the negative externalities associated with electricity
consumption. Typically, this kind of demand-side management (DSM) has focused on providing
consumers with incentives to engage in energy-saving behavior. Prepay rates are important in this respect
because they have the same end-effect of these policies, but they do so at a fraction of the cost. See
Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for a discussion on the cost-effectiveness of conservation programs
(Allcott & Greenstone, 2012).
The paper proceeds as follows: Chapter two provides a description of how prepay plans typically
work, a brief history of their implementation, and a detailed description of the specific program
characteristics for the cooperatives studies in this analysis. In chapter three we provide a theoretical
framework for the demand for energy services and how a different payment plan can alter consumer
behavior. Chapter four describes the data collection process and the descriptive statistics for the sample
used in the analysis. In chapter five, we describe the empirical models employed in the analysis, and
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chapter six provides the results of those models with brief interpretations of their meanings. Finally,
chapter seven summarizes the study’s findings and describes some of the larger implications of the
results.

3

Chapter 2 Study Background
2.1 Prepay Rates
In the United States, nearly all residential electricity is purchased on a monthly billing cycle.
Consumers are charged a fixed fee and a charge based on the amount of electricity (kWhs) that they
consume in a given month. Most consumers are thus unaware of how much electricity they consume until
their bill arrives. Because consumption occurs in advance of billing, electricity providers are at risk from
non-payment. So, to ensure that new customers will be able to reliably pay their bills, electric utilities
typically charge a deposit that can be collected when a customer fails to make their payments. They also
have the ability to disconnect service for consumers who continue to fall behind on payments. This
disconnection, however, often occurs weeks or months after the consumer initially falls behind on
payments.
Prepay or pay-as-you-go rate structures are increasingly seen as an attractive alternative to this
traditional postpay method. Unlike monthly billing, prepay customers pay in advance and they are
continuously notified of their electricity use. These plans usually require little or no deposit because the
electricity will be disconnected before the customer is able to incur a negative balance. One illustrative
comparison that is often used to describe prepay plans is that it is a similar process to paying for gasoline
for one’s vehicle. Putting money into one’s prepay account is like filling up the tank. You decide how
much you would like to buy and can afford, and then you purchase the fuel in advance. In both cases, you
have a way to see how much fuel or electricity you have left so that you can keep from running out. Just
as no one wants to be stuck on the side of the road with no gas, prepay customers have a strong incentive
to maintain a positive balance so their electricity is not disconnected.
The idea of paying in advance to use electricity is not new. Coin-operated electricity meters have
been around since 1901, and they remained common in the United Kingdom until the mid-1980s (Cox,
1901; Owen & Ward, 2010). Until recently, adopting prepay required utilities to install a specialized
meter at each prepay household. Often, these meters use smartcards, which function similarly to a longdistance phone card. Consumers can add money to the card at various locations, and a unit at the meter or
4

in the house can tell them how much money remains. Viewed by many utilities as overly expensive and
cumbersome, these systems never caught on in many countries.
The increasing availability of smart or advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) meters has
brought renewed interest to prepay (R.W. Beck, 2009). In most cases, these meters are not installed for
the purpose of implementing prepay programs. Utilities typically install AMI systems because they
increase meter accuracy, reduce maintenance costs, and better outage management. Once AMI meters are
installed, however, implementing a prepay system becomes much less capital-intensive than the old cardreader systems, and two-way communication at the meter allows the utility to have a more detailed
picture of customer usage. The consumer also benefits with AMI, as it often allows them to pay for
electricity online or over the phone. In many cases, it also gives them the ability to see a much more
detailed picture of their electricity usage (R.W. Beck, 2009).
Figure 2.1 Current and Proposed Prepaid Electric Programs in the US 1

1

Image from Howatt (2012). Image is Current as of March 31, 2012.
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Researchers estimated that about 23 million people worldwide use some form of prepay rate plan
to pay for electricity (Martin, 2012). In the U.K. alone, there are over 4 million customers, or about 15
percent of households, that prepay for electricity (Rocha, Baddeley, & Pollitt, 2013). In the U.S., that
number is much lower. A report from 2009 estimated that there were roughly 100,000 U.S. customers
enrolled in a prepay plan (R.W. Beck, 2009). However, with rising electricity rates, faster
communication speeds, and an increasing prevalence of AMI technology, this number is expected to grow
rapidly, and is most likely already out of date. Figure 2.1 shows the locations of utilities that currently
have plans to implement prepay rates (Howat, 2012). Traditionally, municipal utilities and rural electric
co-ops have been the first utilities to adopt prepay 2, but a newly approved trial by a Kansas Investor
Owner Utility (IOU) could signal a significant expansion of the programs (Tomich, 2014). One survey,
for example, found that 38 percent of electric utilities are considering prepay rates (Howat, 2012).
Utilities have various motivations for implementing prepay programs. Many see the primary
benefit as a way to limit write-offs from bad debt as well as simply increasing the predictability of their
cash-flow. Because of the time value of money, a better cash-flow can improve profits. This is only a
benefit, however, in terms of their relationship with customers that had previous problems with latepayments. It could be argued that the utilities benefit from offering both prepay and postpay because they
each maximize revenue from a different customer class. Another oft-stated benefit is that it has the
potential to reduce operating costs as the automatic disconnect implies that a crew is not required to go
out and manually disconnect service. Some utility employees also argue that the program can improve
the relationship between customers and the utility. As customers become more aware of their usage
patterns, they are less surprised by high costs during certain times of the year. One utility employee noted
that consumers who once felt cheated by the utility, now come into the office to ask for advice on how to
lower their usage (McCoun, 2014). Because of these benefits, some argue that utilities could charge the
same or lower rate to prepay customers. Typically, however, there is a fee, which is justified to regulators
based on the initial capital expenditures and increased payment processing.
2

See section 2.2 for more information on rural electric cooperatives.
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For customers, potential benefits of prepay rates can be divided into two categories. On the one
hand, there are some immediate and direct benefits, which depend on the specifics of the individual
utilities. One of the most common of these benefits is that prepay plans often include no deposit. For
new customers, especially those with poor credit and low incomes, this can be an enticing benefit.
Additional direct benefits might include the elimination of late payments and the subsequent late payment
fees. Many utilities also eliminate disconnect and reconnect fees for prepay customers. These benefits
only apply to customers who have trouble keeping up with payments, but for those customers, it can add
up to a sizeable savings. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) found that “financially troubled”
customers save 20% on their electricity expenditures because of a reduction in late fees and reconnection
fees as well as reductions in consumption (R.W. Beck, 2009).
The other proposed benefits to prepay are more indirect, but they are commonly referred to as the
main motivation behind implementing a prepay program. Those benefits have to do with how prepay
rates can impact consumer behavior. Several researchers have argued that prepayment causes
consumers to be more aware of their energy use, and furthermore, it gives them the incentives and
awareness needed to reduce their consumption (Carter & Claywell, 2014; Lakes, 2014; McCoun, 2014;
Owen & Ward, 2010; R.W. Beck, 2009; Villarreal, 2012). Evidence from industry studies backs up this
idea, showing that consumers that switch from postpay to prepay reduce consumption by 10-18% (Day &
Slobada, 2013; Owen & Ward, 2010; Ozog, 2013; R.W. Beck, 2009; Villarreal, 2012). This opportunity
to more effectively control consumption allows consumers to budget and lower their total expenses.
Prepayment plans are not without criticisms. Many consumer advocates are adamantly opposed
to the rate structure, while others believe that they must be implemented with tight restrictions. Common
arguments are that the plans add fees 3, that they bypass consumer protections, making it easier to
disconnect someone’s electricity, and that they target low-income consumers, creating a “second-class” of
utility customers (Garthwaite, 2014; Howat, 2012; Villarreal, 2012). In many cases in the U.S., these
arguments have been effective at preventing the implementation of prepay programs. Public service
3

Most prepay plans include a monthly program fee.
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commissions (PSCs) and state attorneys general from Massachusetts to California have sided with the
consumer arguments, worried that the new plans will indeed undo consumer protections (Garthwaite,
2014; Howat, 2012; Owen & Ward, 2010; Villarreal, 2012). Critics argue with the premise that the
prepayment plans reduce consumption, stating that choosing to go without a necessary service is not the
same as “savings.” One Sierra Club representative referred to this effect as “deprivation, not
conservation” (Garthwaite, 2014). All of these criticisms fail to take into account, however, the fact that
consumers (especially those with a constrained income) often have fewer fees with prepay because they
are unable to build new debt. More importantly, they do not address the fact that customer surveys
repeatedly show that prepay customers prefer prepay plans to postpay plans (Day & Slobada, 2013; Owen
& Ward, 2010; R.W. Beck, 2009; Villarreal, 2012). As further evidence of this preference, customers
that voluntarily sign up for prepay plans rarely switch back to postpay (Day & Slobada, 2013).
One thing that proponents and critics alike agree on is that prepay will become increasingly
common in the future. As mentioned earlier, the increasing availability of AMI meters will make it a
more feasible option in countries like the U.S. An even larger growth opportunity, however, is in the
developing world where consumers will often go from no access to electricity to access through
prepayment (Garthwaite, 2014). Prepay service was launched on Haiti’s southern peninsula in 2012, for
example, to help people move from “candles and kerosene to grid electricity”(Garthwaite, 2014).
Navigant, a large research and consulting firm, estimates that the number of prepay meters installed
worldwide will quickly rise to 33 million by 2017 (Martin, 2012).
2.2 Prepay in Kentucky
Many of the first utilities to implement prepay plans in the U.S. have been rural electric
cooperatives. See figure 2.1 for a map of utilities that have implemented prepay programs. These
cooperatives are private, non-profit utilities that are owned by the customers that they serve (NRECA,
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2014) 4. Following this trend, the first Kentucky utilities to adopt prepay have all been Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporations (RECCs). Some argue that cooperatives have been the earliest adopters of
prepay programs because they are not subject to the full regulatory authority of public service
commissions (Howat, 2012). However, the RECCs in Kentucky are under the jurisdiction of the state
PSC, which approved all of the new prepay tariffs. A more likely reason that investor-owned utilities
(IOUs) have shied away from prepay plans is that they fear the impact the program could have on their
public profile if it was strongly opposed by consumer advocates, as has been the case in many areas
(R.W. Beck, 2009). Another important factor is that rural cooperatives are, by design, focused on
residential energy sales (NRECA, 2014). In Kentucky, the RECCs are either retailers (distribution) or
wholesalers (the co-ops that generate and transmit the power). The distribution RECCs have some
incentive to reduce consumption because they have to buy it from the generation and transmission (G&T)
co-ops. They also typically have few commercial and even fewer industrial customers. Therefore, when
a service territory has a large number of residential customers that struggle to pay their bills, the co-op has
a large incentive to restructure its payment system.
This paper contains data from two RECCs in Kentucky that have recently adopted a prepay tariff:
Jackson Electric and Bluegrass Electric. Figure 2.2 shows the location of the co-ops’ service territories.
Jackson Electric was the first of the two and the first utility in Kentucky to adopt the prepay tariff. In
many ways, they paved the way for other co-ops in the state to adopt the program. Jackson had to
navigate the concerns of the Public Service Commission, and they faced the most uncertainty on how
their customers would respond. They were not, however, totally in the dark. They modeled much of their
program after other RECCs, such as Brunswick Electric in North Carolina. By the time Jackson initiated
its new tariff, prepay programs were common enough that they were already a built-in-option with many
of the utility software providers.

4

There are generation and transmission (G&T) coops as well as distribution coops. However, when we
refer to cooperatives in this paper, we will only be discussing distribution coops as these are the utilities
that sell the power to residential customers.
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Figure 2.2 Blue Grass Energy and Jackson Energy Service Territories 5

Table 2.1 describes the economic and housing characteristics for each of the RECCs. These
descriptive statistics are important because they help paint a picture of the population being impacted by
the new programs. The individual cooperatives do not maintain housing or economic data on their
members, so all of the statistics listed in the table are an approximation of the customer base for each
utility 6. The co-op service territories are alike in many ways. Beyond the fact that they all represent rural
areas in Kentucky, it is also important to note that they all have a higher than average number of
customers that use electricity as their primary heating fuel. Space heating makes up about 41% of the
average U.S. household’s energy consumption, so areas that use electricity for heat tend to have much
higher electricity bills (EIA, 2013). In many ways, however, Bluegrass Energy stands out from the other
two co-ops in that its customers are much more representative of the state as a whole. Both Jackson
5

Shape files downloaded from the Kentucky Public Service Commission.
Zip-code level data from the 2012 American Community Survey were used. All zip-codes that fell
within one of the service territory boundaries were aggregated together. Often, zip-codes fall within
multiple service territories. Therefore, these descriptions are not exact, but they are useful in providing a
relative comparison to the state as a whole.

6
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Energy and Farmers RECC, on the other hand, have a higher than average percentage of mobile homes 7,
higher unemployment, and lower average incomes than the state average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).
Each of the co-ops’ prepay programs are very similar in structure (See table 2.2). They are all
voluntary, they all have a small monthly fee which is pro-rated on a daily basis, and they all provide some
sort of energy-use feedback. The plans differ some in the size of their monthly fees as well as how they
provide feedback to the customer. Jackson, for example, opted to provide an in-home-display (IHD) for
all prepay customers (see figure 2.3) while bluegrass uses text, email, and phone alerts (see figure 2.4).
Additionally, while both of these prepay plans are based on the utility’s traditional residential rate, these
rates vary significantly among the utilities. Jackson Energy has a higher energy charge and higher
monthly fixed charge, but Bluegrass has a higher prepay program fee. Another important distinction is
that Jackson Energy charges a transaction fee for each payment made onto one’s prepay account,
providing a disincentive for making numerous, small payments. Combining median incomes from table
2.1 with average energy usage and costs from table 2.2, we estimate that electricity costs require an
average of 3% of total household income for Bluegrass customers and roughly 5% for Jackson customers.
If one assumes that customers that enroll in prepay programs have lower incomes, on average, then
electricity costs are likely taking up an even larger share of their budget.
Beyond the mechanics of the rate, these three prepay programs are all very similar in their stated
objectives. In interviews conducted with managers at each of the cooperatives, the author found that they
all see prepay as a means to prevent customers from accruing large debt loads, hoping to eventually lower
the amount of debt that the co-op has to write-off. They all stated, however, that the most important
motivation for implementing the prepay program was to give customers more information, so that they
can better manage their usage to stay within the confines of their budgets. Each of the cooperatives
expects that customers that switch from postpay to prepay will, on average, reduce their energy
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Mobile homes, especially those produced before 1976, are often poorly insulated. Per square foot, these
older mobile homes consume 53% more energy than other types of housing (Environmental and Energy
Study Institute, 2009).
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consumption, but they are unclear on the magnitude of this change (Carter & Claywell, 2014; Lakes,
2014; McCoun, 2014).
2.3 Data Collection
One of the strengths of this study is the unique data set that was acquired.
In order to find appropriate data to study prepay rates, contact was first made with the Kentucky
Association of Electric Cooperatives (KAEC). After discussing the issue, KAEC suggested that some of
the state’s electric cooperatives that had implemented prepay programs might be willing to share
customer usage data. KAEC and the researchers then agreed on three electric cooperatives in the state
that would be representative of the new program. Jackson Electric was chosen because it was the first coop in the state to implement a prepay program, and it had the largest sample of prepay customers.
Bluegrass Electric was also chosen because of its relatively large number of customers. Farmers RECC
was chosen to provide even more diversity to the total sample. The feeling was that these three co-ops
were a good representation of the varying demographic profiles of the co-ops in the state (see chapter 2).
KAEC then introduced the project idea and the researchers to representatives at each of the three coops.
It is unlikely that the researchers would have been able to obtain household level data from the co-ops
without the help of the KAEC.
All three co-ops generously agreed to provide household-level electricity consumption data. Due
to technical difficulties, however, Farmers RECC was unable to gather the information in time for the
publication of this study. While requiring considerable back-and-forth communication, the other two
utilities were able to put together large data sets of prepay and postpay customers that could be used in the
empirical analysis. The researchers also desired descriptive information about the customers as well as
their housing type. This would have made it possible to compare the sample of prepay customers to the
larger population of co-op members. The co-ops, however, do not keep this kind of information.
Household addresses would have allowed the researchers to find housing characteristics through county
property tax databases, but the co-ops are unable to share addresses because of state and federal privacy
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protection rules. In addition to quantitative data, the cooperatives were also extremely helpful in
providing descriptive information about the programs. The researchers conducted interviews with
program managers at each of the co-ops, which later informed much of the content for chapter 2.

13

Table 2.1 Demographic Characteristics
Bluegrass

Jackson

KY

195,538

108,907

1,927,916

7.93%

20.85%

12.50%

2011 or Later

0.47%

0.40%

0.30%

2000 to 2009

16.83%

14.37%

14.20%

1990 to 1999

20.47%

20.77%

17.60%

1980 to 1989

16.39%

17.18%

13.30%

1970 to 1979

17.20%

17.38%

17.10%

1960 to 1969

9.40%

11.92%

11.50%

1950 to 1959

6.92%

7.63%

9.90%

1940 to 1949

3.05%

3.88%

5.00%

1939 or earlier

9.27%

6.48%

11.10%

Total Housing Units
Mobile Home %
Construction year of home

Housing Tenure
Occupied Housing Units

176,052

94,952

1,691,716

Renter Occupied

34.89%

31.57%

31.00%

Owner Occupied

65.11%

68.43%

68.03%

Primary Heating Fuel
Occupied Housing Units

176,052

94,952

1,691,716

Utility Gas

29.18%

23.66%

39.50%

Electric

60.60%

62.72%

49.00%

Other Fuel

9.99%

12.69%

11.37%

No Fuel

0.14%

0.11%

0.18%

$142,602

$98,695

$120,000

230,793

106,641

2,054,159

8.61%

11.49%

9.50%

Median Household Income*

$46,262

$30,311

$42,610

Total households

176,052

94,952

1,691,716

Under$15,000

15.06%

23.37%

17.40%

$15,000 - $34,999

22.40%

28.08%

24.80%

$35,000 - $74,999

34.30%

30.66%

32.40%

$75,000 - $149,999

22.90%

15.14%

20.60%

Greater than $150,000

5.36%

2.75%

4.90%

Households Receiving SSI

5.37%

10.24%

7.10%

Median Home Value*
Employment
Civ. Labor Force
Unemployed
Income

*average weighted mean of median by zip code
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Table 2.2 Prepay Program Characteristics
Bluegrass

Jackson

55,000

51,240

1,450

3,000

2.64%

5.85%

550

1,222

1,253

1,228

42

27

9/17/2012

6/27/2011

$9.73/ month

$10.44/ month

$8.75/ month

$5.00/ month

$0.62

$0.51

Energy Charge ($/KWh)

$0.08951

$0.09849

Transaction Fee

$0.00

$1.25

In Home Display (IHD)
provided?

No

Yes

Cell Phone Alerts

Yes

Yes

Email alerts

Yes

No

Prepay Contract Length

1 year

No contract

Average Deposit Required

$225

$400

Late Fee Charge

7.50%

5%

Reconnection Fee

$50/ $75 after hours

$25

Total Residential Members (As
of July 1, 2014)
Total Prepay Customers (As of
July 1, 2014)
Percentage of members
Total Prepay Customers after
first 6 months
Average monthly residential
Usage in 2013 (kwh)
# of customers who switch back
from prepay to post pay
First day prepay program was
available to customers
Customer Charge (Monthly fixed
fee for all customers)
Program Fee (Monthly fixed fee
for prepay customers)
Daily base charge (Total fixed
fees/30)

Avoided Fees

15

Figure 2.3 In-Home Display (IHD) Used by Jackson Electric
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Figure 2.4 Sample Text Message Alerts for Prepay Account Holders
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Model
Both economic and psychological factors significantly impact household consumption decisions.
This section outlines a theoretical framework that demonstrates how consumption decisions are impacted
by the way in which consumers pay (such as prepayment or postpayment) and the information they have
available. This theory provides the framework and a guide for the empirical analysis.
3.1 A Metaphor
Consider the amount of gas a family purchases for their car. How much will they purchase? It is
mostly a function of how far they want to drive, how efficiently their vehicle uses gas, and how they
choose to drive the vehicle. However, are there other behavioral factors that impact how much gas they
choose to purchase? Does it matter that we can watch the price go up as we fill up our tank? Does it
matter that we must pay for our fuel before using it? And does it matter that there is a consequence to
letting that fuel run out? It’s strange to image a situation in which we could drive our car as much as we
like, not knowing how much gas we’re consuming, and not being charged for that gas until the end of the
month, yet that’s almost exactly how most of us pay for electricity. The following section details the
economic theory on why the method of payment might impact one’s consumption decisions.
3.2 Residential Electricity Demand Model:
Individuals consume electricity in order to produce various residential services (lighting, cooking,
entertainment, heating, etc.). In that sense, any demand model for residential electricity consumption is a
derived demand for the specific services provided by electricity. The model must, therefore, account for
the interactive demands between energy using capital (i.e. appliances) and the energy used by that capital
(i.e. electricity) (Lakshmanan & Anderson, 1980).
Economists have been analyzing this derived demand for electricity consumption for at least 63
years, starting with Houthakker in 1951 (Houthakker, 1951). Lakshmanan and Anderson built on the
work foundational of Houthakker, and provided us with our initial framework for a static equilibrium
model of residential energy use (1980). In the short-run, we assume that a residential consumer’s ability
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to change their energy consuming capital stock is fixed 8. Their demand for electricity is simply a
function of its price, the price of substitute fuels, household income, residential characteristics, and
weather (Lakshmanan & Anderson, 1980). In this model, a consumer with a fixed budget can only
respond to price increases or extreme weather by lowering their demand for energy services. This would
include actions such as turning off lights, lowering the thermostat, or adjusting the temperature of the
water heater.
For individual consumers, i, we specify the above static equilibrium model as follows:
Equation 3.1
Where:

∗
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑓𝑓(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )

i= The individual consumer/household

j = The geographic location of the consumer (In this case, their utility service territory).
t = The tth month
∗
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= The quantity of energy demanded in month t

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = The income of household I in month t

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = The price of electricity in location j in month t

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = The price of substitute fuels in location j in month t

𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = The weather and climate conditions in location j in month t
Numerous studies have used a similar framework to assess the determinants of residential energy

consumption. Many of these focus on the characteristics of the i households. Brounan, Kok, and
Quigley, for example, identify nine physical characteristics 9 and ten demographics characteristics 10 that
all have a significant impact on a household’s energy consumption (Brounen, Kok, & Quigley, 2012).

8

The long-run, of course, presents the consumer with different options. They can, for instance, purchase
appliances that produce the same energy service with less energy.
9
The nine physical characteristics are dwelling type, period of construction, historic structure, dwelling
size, number of rooms, central heating, maintenance interior, maintenance exterior, and insulation
quality.
10
The ten demographic characteristics are number of persons in household, age of head of household,
single person household, household with children, age of oldest child, number of children, elderly
household, fraction of females in household, occupied by foreign born, and household income.
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Other studies, such as Costa and Kahn (2013), have shown that even ideological factors can determine a
household’s electricity consumption.
Including these demographic, household, and ideological characteristics helps researchers
identify the energy service preferences of the given household, providing a more complete model of
residential electricity consumption. Costa and Kahn summarize this model as follows: Consumers
demand various energy services for which electricity is an input. One’s total electricity consumption in a
given period is a sum of the electricity required for each of those services. This consumption depends on
choices over 1) the physical attributes of the house such as its size and age; 2) the attributes of the
appliances (which convert electricity into energy services); and 3) the amount one choses to use those
appliances. All of these choices, in turn, are shaped by climate, prices, income, and characteristics of the
household (demographics and ideology) (Costa & Kahn, 2013).
All of the models described above are based on a neoclassical economic framework, assuming
that consumers are utility-maximizing, rational individuals with perfect information. Given those
assumptions, the payment structure (i.e. Prepay rate plans) should have no effect on one’s demand for
electricity. Many other schools of economic literature, however, argue that there are behavioral factors
that must be considered. In the ensuing sections, we will describe some of the factors that cause
consumer decision making to deviate from the classical economic framework of optimality.
3.3 The Role of Information:
Many have argued that energy is essentially invisible to the typical consumer (Hargreaves, Nye,
& Burgess, 2010). First, it is a physically invisible commodity, entering the house through often hidden
wires. More importantly, however, energy consuming actions are often “inconspicuous routines and
habits,” and consumers have a difficult time connecting energy use to specific actions (Hargreaves et al.,
2010). Consumers have never been entirely blind when it comes to information on their energy usage,
it’s just that this information has typically been delayed or labor intensive to acquire. One can use the
previous month’s bill, for example, to predict the current month’s usage. Another option has been to
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check the outside electrical meter, record the total usage, and monitor how it changes. A much more
effective/realistic approach, however, is to provide some sort of direct feedback11 (see figure 3.2.1) to the
consumer.
Figure 3.1 Types of Feedback for Electricity Usage

(Ehrhardt-Martinez, Donnelly, & Laitner, 2010)

Economists and other behavioral scientists have been analyzing the impact of information
feedback on electrical consumption since the late 1970s. These early behavioral science studies found
feedback can lead to significant reductions in electricity consumption (Bittle, Valesano, & Thaler, 1979;
Hayes & Cone, 1981; Winett, Neale, & Grier, 1979). More recent economic studies have found similar
results, often using much larger sample sizes and more rigorous techniques. In a review of the feedback
literature, Darby found that direct feedback leads to a reduction of five to fifteen percent (Darby, 2006).
11

Direct feedback is typically defined as being nearly instantaneous and easy to comprehend (Darby,
2006).
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Another study did a controlled experiment, looking specifically at the impact of electricity usage feedback
by means of text messages (the feedback method employed by two of the three utilities analyzed in this
study) and found that they led to a three percent reduction (Gleerup, Larsen, Leth-Petersen, & Togeby,
2010). Many recent studies, however, urge caution in assuming any long-term reduction in consumption,
arguing that any effects of feedback diminish over time (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Gleerup et al., 2010). A
further complication is that there may be some interaction between the feedback and the rate structure of
prepay plans. Faruqui, Sergici, and Sharif, for example, found that feedback with prepay leads to twice
the level of reduction as feedback alone (Faruqui, Sergici, & Sharif, 2010).
Traditional neoclassical economic theory tells us that an electricity consumer i at time t will
partake in an energy-saving action if it increases their utility, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (Ek & Söderholm, 2010). In the

neoclassical sense, there is nothing about increased feedback or a prepay rate plan that should alter this
utility model 12. After all, the costs and benefits associated with the actions have not changed. We have
shown, however, that there is significant evidence that feedback can alter consumption, proving that
something about the model is deficient in terms of describing real world electricity usage. One school of
economic literature that attempts to address this deficit is known as transaction cost economics (TCE).
Similar to agency theory, TCE emphasizes asymmetric information, but it also extends the classical
framework by focusing on the concept of bounded rationality and transaction costs (Prindle et al., 2007).
In the context of economic theory, bounded rationality refers to consumers’ limited time, attention, and
ability to process complicated information. Instead of searching for “optimal” solutions, they will default
to status quo actions, economizing on time and cognitive resources 13 (Simon, 1959). Essentially, these
theories recognize that there is a cost to the decision-making process.

12

Perfect information is an important assumption with neoclassical theory. We described above the ways
in which consumers have had access to information on their electricity use. We suggest that this
assumption is not violated, but there is a transaction cost associated with acquiring the information that is
not accounted for.
13
A related idea is the theory of rational inattention. This theory implies that the costs and energy
involved with accurately measuring the impacts of one’s behavior can be so significant that a rational
consumer will ignore them. Sallee describes has this can be applied to energy efficiency (Sallee, 2013).
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Many argue that bounded rationality plays an important role in the context of electricity
consumption (Ek & Söderholm, 2010). In this context, consumers have a strong preference for status
quo. In the case of energy consumption, that can mean consuming more than what is in their best interest
in terms of utility. There are many reasons why households often stick to status quo decision-making.
Behavioral science, for example, tells us that individuals have a bias towards the present situation and will
often neglect future cost savings (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Another theory that supports this idea
is the omission bias, or the idea that individuals often prefer options that require no action over active
decisions (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). All of this evidence supports the idea that households have a
lot of inertia working against changes in their electricity consumption routine, especially if they are
unsure of the actual costs and benefits.
Information can play an important role in moving individuals closer to optimal decision-making.
The right kind of information can activate cultural or social norms that might highlight the importance of
electricity-saving behavior (Ek & Söderholm, 2010). More important for this analysis, however, is the
idea that information can act as a nudge that can remind the consumer of the potential cost savings of
behavior changes.
3.4 Planners and Doers:
Individuals who wish to lower their energy consumption in order to save money must deal with
an inherent conflict between their short-term and long-term interest. One can have every intention to
maximize long-run utility by lowering energy costs, but this is often in conflict with one’s immediate and
myopic short-term desires. Thaler and Shifren described this phenomenon by a creating a new economic
theory based on our planner and doer selves (1981). Similar to the principle-agent theory of the firm,
they argue that individuals have two competing sets of interest at any given time. The doer part of the
individual is focused on maximizing near-term utility, while the planner is focused on long-term utility,
which often means that short-term sacrifices have to be made (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).
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This theory can also be used to describe the somewhat counterintuitive idea that people often
purposefully impose constraints on their future behavior in order to maximize expected utility. These
constraints are often the only way that the planner can impact the actions of the doer. One way to think
of voluntarily signing up for a prepay plan is that it is a type of commitment device. Essentially, one is
making a second-order decision to impact their first-order decisions (Sunstein & Ullmann‐Margalit,
1999). Much of the literature that emanates from the planner-doer model focuses on individual savings.
Many have found that making a second-order decision to decrease the liquidity of a savings product 14 can
prevent one from making first-order decisions (i.e. spending some of the savings) that decreases longterm utility. One would think that increased liquidity would always increase utility, but many have
shown that the opposite is true when it comes to savings (Laibson, 1997; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).
There is strong evidence that consumption increases as one’s access to credit increases
(Ludvigson, 1999). This is why people who wish to cut their spending are often advised to use debit cards
in place of credit cards. A debit card can be thought of as a commitment device, because it limits
spending to the amount of money that is currently available in their checking account. In many ways,
prepay acts as a very similar type of commitment device. A postpay, monthly plan is essentially free
credit from the utility that allows the consumer to easily consume as much as he or she desires. Prepay
plans add the extra step of having to continually add money to one’s account, forcing the consumer to
make an active decision about their level of electricity usage.

14

A Christmas savings account is a commonly used example. They are uncommon now, but these
accounts often pay little or no interest and impose a penalty for early withdrawals. They were, however,
very popular before the spread of credit cards.
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Chapter 4 Data
4.1 Data Description
Meter-level residential energy use data was obtained from two RECCs in Central and Eastern
Kentucky. The data includes customer identification numbers, monthly usage, and an indicator variable
for whether or not the customer was enrolled in a prepay plan. The co-ops provided meter data for
postpay customers who never enroll in prepay, customers who began as postpay and switch to prepay, and
new customers that were enrolled in prepay from the beginning 15. The empirical analysis employed in
this study only looks at prepay customers that had previously been enrolled as postpay customers. The
other categories are used only for comparison.
Having household level data is a major strength of this analysis. This kind of panel data creates
more variability, making a more efficient estimation possible (Kennedy, 2008). It would be very difficult
to conduct an informative analysis on prepay rates with only aggregate data.
When selecting customers, all three co-ops obtained previous usage history on households that
were currently active co-op members at the time that the data was being collected. This was done for
practical reasons, but creates a selection bias. The data does not include customers that left the service
territory nor does it include customers that switched back to postpay after being enrolled in prepay. This
last category, however, represents such a small number of households (see table 2.2) that its omission is
insignificant. Monthly observations range from March of 2008 to July of 2014. Being that not all
households were active co-op members at the same time and that each household enrolled in the program
at a different time, the data are highly unbalanced. The goal was to include all months that the customer
was enrolled in prepay, and at least one full year of observations prior to enrolling in the program.
The complete data set obtained from Bluegrass Energy included usage data on 1,362 prepay
customers with an average of 11.7 observations per customer for a total of 15,908 observations. Jackson
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To avoid confusion, from this point on, “prepay” customers will refer to customers that are enrolled in
the program at any point. “Enrolled” customer will refer to customers that are enrolled in a prepay
program at that point in time. “Post-pay” customers will refer to customers that never enroll in prepay.
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Energy provided usage data on 200 prepay customers, for a total of 9,768 observations 16 with an average
of 48.8 observations per customer. Both coops also provided a small sample of postpay customers as a
comparison. We also obtained a small sample of usage data on postpay customers that never enroll in a
prepay program. This includes 130 customers from Bluegrass Electric and 100 customers from Jackson
Electric.
Much of the data that was originally received had to be transformed or excluded from the
analysis. While most of the data was provided in a monthly format, some of the original data from
Jackson Electric was in the form of daily meter readings. This daily data was consolidated into a monthly
format. On occasion, there were multiple observations per month for a given customer. This only
occurred in the months immediately following the transition to prepay. These observations were removed
because there was no way to distinguish the exact point in the month when the customer enrolled. All
months with negative or zero kWh readings were also dropped.
We then generate several variables that are principle to our analysis. Enroll is a time-constant
dummy-variable for whether a household is ever enrolled in the prepay program. Previous History is a
time-constant dummy variable for whether a prepay household was a postpay co-op member before
switching to prepay. This variable is necessary because all of our models only include data from
households that have previous history with the co-op. Because descriptive data is unavailable, we attempt
to isolate the prepay effect by looking only at prepay customers that had previously been enrolled as
postpay customers. Finally, we generate a “Time” variable that measures the program tenure of the
households. It counts the months from the households’ first month of enrollment in the prepay program.

16

Due to software limitations, Jackson Energy had to extract the data one customer at a time, thus
explaining the smaller sample size.
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Electricity Consumption (kWh)
Mean
Standard dev.
Min
Max
Monthly Avg. Cooling Degree Days
Mean
Standard dev.
Min
Max
Monthly Avg. Heating Degree Days
Mean
Standard dev.
Min
Max

Bluegrass Jackson

Total

1,737
1,132
2
8,604

1,497
915
2
8,136

1,597
1,018
2
8,604

2.2
3.3
0
17.5

3.1
3.9
0
14

2.8
3.6
0
17.5

19.5
16.1
0
45.9

11.8
11.6
0
36.9

15.0
14.2
0
45.9

6,555
383
17.11

9,140
191
47.88

15,695
574
27.34

Observations
Count (N)
Customers (n)
Monthly Obs. (T-bar)

Once these changes were made, the complete data set used in the analysis contains 15,695
observations from 574 customers (see table 4.1). 191 of those customers are Jackson Electric members
and the other 383 are members of the Bluegrass Electric Cooperative. On average, there were many more
monthly observations from Jackson Electric customers than the customers from Bluegrass. Much of this
difference can be explained by the fact that Jackson Electric started its program almost 15 months before
Bluegrass. The average monthly electricity consumption is 1,737 kWhs for Bluegrass Electric customers,
1,497 kWhs for Jackson Electric customers, and 1,597 kWhs for the entire sample. Comparing
participants and nonparticipants, we find that households that participate in prepay programs use
significantly more electricity, on average, than customers that never enroll in a prepay program (see table
4.2).
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Table 4.2 Comparing Sample to Postpay Customers
Postpay
Total
Observations
Households
Mean Electricity Usage
(kWh)
Mean ACDD
Mean AHDD

Prepay
Before
Enrollment

After
Enrollment

7,828.00

15,695.00

9,080.00

6,615.00

230.00

574.00

574.00

532.00

1,158.11

1,597.00

1,708.83

1,443.10

3.17

2.80

2.84

3.37

14.54

15.00

13.93

14.49

Figure 4.1 compares these consumption levels on a monthly basis. This dissimilarity is important to note
because it implies that the households that enroll in a prepay program, which are the households that
makeup our sample, are not necessarily representative of the large population of co-op members. We do
not have any data that explains the reason for this large difference in consumption, but anecdotal evidence
from the utilities suggests that an inefficient housing stock and electric heating are two of the most
important factors (Carter & Claywell, 2014; Lakes, 2014; McCoun, 2014).
Figure 4.1 Comparing sample to non-prepay customers
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One of the main drivers of electricity usage is weather. We combine weather data with the
monthly usage data so that we can later control for its effect. We use weather data from the Midwest
Regional Climate Center, which was compiled by the University of Kentucky College of Agriculture
Weather Center. Separate readings are obtained for each utility service area. A centrally located airport
is used as a corresponding weather station for each utility. Average cooling degree days (ACDD) and
average heating degree days (AHDD) are the variables of interest for the analysis. Degree days are the
difference between daily average temperatures and 65 degrees. Average temperatures are calculated by
averaging the daily minimum and the daily maximum. CDDs are the number of degrees above 65 and
HDDs are the number of degrees below 65. Average degree days refer to a monthly average of daily
totals. The mean ACDD is 2.8, the mean AHDD is 15. Figure 4.2 shows how closely total degree days
(CDD+HDD) align with the electricity consumption of the sample households.

Figure 4.2 Average monthly usage (kWh) and monthly degree days, 2008-2014
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Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis
This section details the methods of analysis employed in this study. The analysis will focus on
three primary questions: Do prepay customers change their consumption behavior after enrolling in a
prepayment plan? If this effect exists, how does it vary seasonally? And does this participation effect
diminish over time? We use a fixed-effects research design in which the identification of the behavioral
response is based on a comparison of participants’ consumption, before and after enrollment in the prepay
program. The study contains three separate fixed-effects models to address each of the above questions.
In Chapter four, we discussed the fact that the treated group, the customers that chose to adopt
prepay, show significantly different patterns of electricity consumption than the population as a whole.
We assume that there is a strong self-selection bias with our sample as the participants made an
endogenous decision to participate. Following Heckman’s discussion of selection bias, this implies that a
comparison of prepay customers with postpay customers would result in a biased estimate of the
program’s effect (Heckman, 1979). There are various methods to control for this effect, but they all
require additional descriptive data that was unavailable for this analysis. To avoid the self-selection
problem, we focus the analysis on a somewhat different question. Instead of treating prepay customers as
a random selection of the larger population, we focus on how the participants change their consumption
after enrolling in the program. Ozog uses a similar design to measure the impact of prepay on energy
consumption (2013). He notes that this type of methodology is especially relevant for prepay programs,
which are almost all voluntary (Ozog, 2013). In other words, utilities and other decision-makers are most
interested in the effect on the customers that self-select into the program.
5.1 Fixed Effects Model
The fixed effects model is a simple linear regression model for panel data in which the intercept
terms vary across all individuals, or households, in our case. The fixed-effects model can be specified as
follows:
Equation 5.1
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the monthly dependent variable, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the unobserved individual-specific effect,

𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽 is a vector of explanatory variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term (Verbeek, 2012). The individual fixedeffect, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , captures all the time-invariant variation among the different households. In other words, we

assume that all of the households in the model have varying characteristics that impact their consumption
of electricity. This estimator attempts to control for that variation.
A random-effects model, which requires fewer degrees of freedom, would be a more efficient
estimator than a fixed-effects model. The problem with this kind of model, however, is that the x value
can be correlated to the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent estimators (Kennedy, 2008).
To test if this is the case in this analysis, a Hausman test is used. The Hausman test compares the
random effects estimates to the unbiased fixed effects estimates (Kennedy, 2008). For all but one of the
models below, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients is not
systematic, indicating that the random effects model is biased. We, therefore, conclude that the fixed
effects model is more appropriate. Even in the case where the random effects model was not found to be
biased, we still use the fixed-effects model for consistency. It is also worth noting that the estimates
between the models are qualitatively very similar.
5.2 The Prepayment Effect
The empirical analysis begins with a simple model that attempts to isolate the effect of enrolling
in the prepay program. To evaluate whether there is a change, we use a fixed effects model in which we
regress a household’s monthly electricity consumption, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , on its decision to

enroll in the prepay program, Prepay it . We also control for weather variation and the individual co-op for
which the household is a member. This model can be expressed in the following form:

Equation 5.2
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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Where the dependent variable, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , is the monthly electricity consumption in kWhs for household i in

month t; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the unobserved individual-specific effect; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is a time-dependent dummy variable for

whether the household is enrolled in the prepayment program in month t; and 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 and 𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 are

explanatory variables representing average cooling degree days and average heating degree days. We

cannot include a separate variable for the household’s co-op, because any variation associated with the
different service territories is captured within the fixed effects estimator, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 . The estimate of 𝛽𝛽1 is the

primary variable of interest as it indicates the change in consumption associated with participation in a
prepay program. Any negative coefficient for this estimate will be consistent with the theory.
We also estimate a log-log specification of the model, and all other models discussed in this
analysis. We chose to show only the linear model for several reasons. First, the linear models are a better
fit for the data set. Secondly, we wish to be consistent with the literature on changes to electricity
consumption. Jacobsen, for example, chose a linear over a log-log model for his analysis on the effect of
building codes on electricity consumption (Jacobsen & Kotchen, 2011). We also find that both models

produce results that are qualitatively similar. Finally, the results from the linear model are much easier to
interpret. For example, it is impossible to extrapolate a precise, overall annual effect of the prepay plan
from the 𝛽𝛽1 coefficient of a log-log model. This is due to the nonlinearity of the model and the fact that
there is so much variation among months of the year (Jacobsen & Kotchen, 2011).
5.3 Seasonal Variation of Prepay Effect
In order to further explore the relationship between the prepay rate and weather, an additional
model is employed that interacts Prepay t with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 . The purpose of this model is to see

how customers enrolled in the prepay program respond to weather variability, which is one of the primary
drivers of electricity consumption (EIA, 2013).

Equation 5.3
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
× 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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This model follows the same form as Equation 5.2 except for the addition of two new interaction
terms. These new variables, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , will indicate how consumers

respond to changes in weather when they are enrolled in the prepay program. We hypothesize that both
coefficients will be negative and significant, indicating that an increase in degree days will result in a
smaller increase in electricity consumption for customers that are enrolled in prepay as compared to
postpay customers. In other words, it would imply that customers temper their demand for heating and
cooling after enrolling in a prepay plan. A significant and negative coefficient for 𝛽𝛽1 would imply that

consumers use less electricity on prepayment plans, even when there is no heating or air conditioning
requirement.
A second approach to the question of seasonal variability is to look at how the prepay effect

varies across months of the year. To look at the question from this perspective, we create a new model in
which monthly terms are added. The model is specified as follows:

Equation 5.4
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

In this specification, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑡𝑡 , is a dummy variable for each month of the year, excluding October. We

use October as the baseline year because, on average, electricity consumption is lowest during that month.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑡𝑡 is a new variable that interacts the month dummies with the prepay dummy. The 𝛿𝛿s

are our variables of interest for this model. Similar to the model above, we hypothesize that summer and
winter months will have significant and negative coefficients because we expect customers to use less
heating and cooling when enrolled in a prepay plan. In this model, changes in temperature are partially
captured within the monthly dummy variables, but it may be that there are other characteristics of the
monthly variables that impact usage as well.
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5.4 Backsliding
The final question we investigate is whether the length of time that a household has been enrolled
impacts the prepayment effect discussed above. We begin with equation 5.3 and add a new continuous
variable Time it that indicates how long (in months) a household i has been enrolled in a prepay plan.

Equation 5.5
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
× 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The variable Time it is calculated by subtracting the first month that the household was enrolled in a

prepay plan from the current observation month. All observations prior to enrollment have a zero value
for this variable. Based on existing literature, we expect that, if a significant effect exists, that it will be
negative. Allcott and Rogers, for example, show that there is a pattern of “action and backsliding” in
response to home energy reports that are intended to alter electricity consumption behavior (Allcott &
Rogers, 2012). They also identify numerous other studies that show similar responses.
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Chapter 6 Results
In this section, we will present the results of the fixed-effects models outlined in Chapter 5. The
results of all four specifications can be found in table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Model Results
5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

Coeff.

Std. Err.

Coeff.

Std. Err.

Coeff.

Std. Err.

Coeff.

Std. Err.

Prepay

-177.4***

(11.44)

20.25

(28.79)

11.47

(38.42)

-109.7***

(32.36)

ACDD

61.33***

(2.078)

68.81***

(2.540)

67.22***

(2.540)

AHDD

42.43***

(0.551)

47.16***

(0.724)

46.55***

(0.726)

PrepayXACDD

-17.50***

(4.405)

-13.78**

(4.415)

PrepayXAHDD

-10.35***

(1.107)

-9.248***

(1.111)

4.550***

(0.522)

587.9***

(28.03)

Time
January

1285.1***

(31.90)

February

1347.9***

(31.95)

March

733.0***

(31.54)

April

410.9***

(32.05)

May

42.75

(32.90)

June

181.8***

(33.65)

July

353.1***

(33.77)

August

377.1***

(33.84)

September

165.6***

(33.90)

November

345.3***

(31.82)

December

789.6***

(31.94)

Jan X Prepay

-31.34

(50.69)

Feb X Prepay

-540.9***

(50.61)

Mar X Prepay

-56.77

(50.22)

Apr X Prepay

-388.8***

(51.32)

May X Prepay

-154.9**

(51.27)

Jun X Prepay

-141.9**

(51.11)

Jul X Prepay

-138.8*

(54.30)

Aug X Prepay

-253.3***

(55.92)

Sep X Prepay

-238.5***

(55.12)

Nov X Prepay

53.93

(51.81)

Dec X Prepay
Constant

864.9***

(14.80)

776.0***

(17.91)

-48.16

(51.14)

1129.3***

(23.24)

R-sq: Within

0.342

0.346

0.335

0.350

R-sq: Between

0.092

0.100

0.088

0.090

R-sq: Overall

0.219

0.223

0.201

0.219

N

15695

15695

15695

15695

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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6.1 The Prepayment Effect
The results of our first model (equation 5.2) indicate that Prepay t has a significant and negative
impact on household electricity consumption. Specifically, the model demonstrates that, all else being
equal, a customer will consume 177.4 kWhs less after enrolling in a prepay program. This effect can also
be expressed as an 11.1% decline when compared to our sample’s monthly average consumption of 1,597
kWhs. This reduction is in line with our expectations, which are based on the theoretical models outlined
in chapter 3.
As expected, both ACDD t and AHDD t were significant and positive. All else being equal, a one
degree increase in average monthly cooling degree days results in 61.33 kWh increase in electricity
consumption. Similarly, a one degree increase in average monthly heating degree days results in a 42.43
kWh increase. Multiplying these results by the sample’s average CDDs and HDDs provides an
interesting way to think of these results. We find that consumption linked to CDDs represent about
10.7% of annual consumption. HDDs, meanwhile, can explain nearly 40% of the samples average annual
consumption. This is further evidence of the importance of heating to total electricity use in the service
territories represented in our sample.
We do not have data that indicates how consumers are tempering their demand. It could be that
they are changing their behavior, doing things like raising their thermostat in the summer and lowering it
in the winter. This would, in effect, be a decrease in overall demand for energy services. Conversely,
customers could be making investments in insulation or better appliances that could allow them to heat
and cool their home more efficiently. Without additional data or a follow-up survey, understanding the
“how” aspect of this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
6.2 Seasonal Variation of Prepay Effect
We use two different models to investigate the question of how the prepay effect varies
seasonally. In the first model (Equation 5.3), Prepay t , by itself, is insignificant. To understand why this
might be the case, it makes sense to first explain the other coefficients in the model. As in the model
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above, ACDD t and AHDD t were significant and positive, indicating that consumption increases by 68.81
and 47.16 kWhs, respectively, as average degree days increase by one. What makes this model different
is the addition of the interaction terms, PrepayXACDD t and PrepayXAHDD t . Both of these terms are
found to be significant and negative. To be interpreted, they must be combined with the ACDD t and
AHDD t coefficients. For example, a one degree increase in ACDDs implies that a postpay customer will,
on average, consume an additional 68.81 kWhs. To measure the average change in consumption for a
prepay customer, however, one must combine ACDD t and PrepayXACDD t . In this case then, a prepay
customers consumption would, on average, change by 68.81 kWhs minus 17.50 kWhs, resulting in a total
change of 51.31 kWhs. Similarly, in response to a one degree increase in AHDDs, a prepay customer
would increase their consumption by 47.16 kWhs minus 10.35 kWs, resulting in a total increase of 36.81
kWhs.
As was mentioned in chapter 5, we can interpret the negative coefficients on the interaction terms
as a sign that customers temper their demand for heating and cooling after enrolling in a prepay program.
How, then do we interpret the insignificance of the Prepay t coefficient? This implies that, in the absence
of degree days, there is no significant difference between a customer’s consumption before and after
enrolling in a prepay plan. One theory of why this might be the case is that total energy costs for such
mild periods are so low that the customer has less incentive to change behavior. Another theory is that
changing the way one consumes heating and cooling energy services is simply the most effective way to
reduce consumption. Again, we do not have any information that answers the “how” aspect of this
change. The takeaway message of this model is that the prepay effect is more pronounced during periods
of high or low temperatures than during mild weather.
We estimate a second model (Equation 5.4) to investigate the question of how the prepay effect
varies seasonally. Instead of heating degree days, this model uses monthly dummy variables as well as
monthly interactions with the Prepay t variable. Overall, we found that the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑡𝑡 variables

are not as significant as PrepayXACDD t and PrepayXAHDD t at measuring how consumer behavior varies
throughout the year. As table 6.1 shows, all of the monthly dummy variables are positive, and all but the
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month of May are significant. We expected a positive sign on these coefficients as we chose to use
October as a reference month because it had the lowest average electricity consumption. Most, but not all
of the interaction terms are significant and negative. Like the model above, one must combine the
interaction term with the monthly dummy in order to interpret these coefficients. Using April as an
example, a postpay customer consumes an average of 410 kWhs more than in October. Once they switch
to prepay, however, that difference decreases by 389, resulting in a total consumption level that is 21
kWhs higher than the reference month. To help explain the results of this model, we created a bar graph
(Figure 6.1) that compares the model’s predicted electricity consumption for a postpay consumer and a
prepay consumer. The graph is more effective at showing that, even as consumption moves up and down
with the seasons, customers enrolled in prepay almost always consume less electricity.

Predicted Electricity Consumption (kWhs)

Figure 6.1 Predicted Electricity Consumption Based on Model 5.4
3000
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** Indicates that both month dummy and interaction term are significant, * indicates that just
one is significant

Post-Pay

Prepay

Due to the limited years of observations, we caution taking too much meaning from the monthly
variations illustrated by this model. Months are not as effective as degree days at capturing seasonality
because the weather can vary so dramatically from year to year. The results of this model, then, are
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sensitive to the specific years of observations in the sample. It could be that there are additional insights
captured by monthly dummies, but it appears that the coefficients track very closely to what one would
expect based solely on that month’s average temperature. We therefore conclude that degree days are a
much better indication of the seasonality of the program’s effect.
6.3 Backsliding
The results of our final model show that, in addition to the prepay effect varying seasonally, it
also diminishes over time. This last model (Equation 5.5) is the same as Equation 5.3 except for the
addition of the variable Time it , which we find to be positive and significant. This means that, all else
being equal, every additional month that a customer is enrolled in a prepay program leads to a 4.55
kWh/month increase in consumption. Put another way, the coefficient for Prepay t shows that consumers
use 109.7 kWhs less after enrolling in the program. The Time it coefficient implies that this reduction
decreases by 4.55 kWhs for every additional month that the customer is enrolled. This result matches our
expectations, which are based on the well-researched theory that many behavior-focused programs show
signs of backsliding over time. A larger period of observation would allow us to determine if this effect is
consistent in the long-term, implying that the prepay effect would eventually diminish to zero. The short
time frame in this analysis, however, precludes this type of analysis.
As mentioned above, the prepay coefficient is -109.7 and is found to be significant. This result
runs counter to the results from Equation 5.3, which was discussed in section 6.2. We expect that the
Time it variable has produced a more realistic model because the averaging that occurs in model 5.3 is
hiding the difference between newly enrolled customers and those that have been enrolled for a long
period of time. For example, imagine a month with zero average HDD or CDD. While model 5.3
indicated that there was no significant difference between prepay and postpay consumers on average,
model 5.5 suggests that a newly enrolled prepay customer will use significantly less electricity. This
difference will then diminish over the time period that the customer is enrolled.
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The coefficients on the interaction terms PrepayXACDD t and PrepayXAHDD t are very similar to
the results from equation 5.3. Combining these coefficients with the ACDD t and AHDD t coefficients, we
find that prepay customers increase their consumption by 53.44 kWhs per month or 37.30 kWhs per
month in response to a one degree change in ACDDs or AHDDs, respectively. Postpay customers, on the
other hand, increase their consumption by 67.22 or 46.55 in response to the same change in weather.
When the coefficients of all of the variables are used to estimate consumption, we find that households
decrease their monthly consumption by a range of 9-20% after enrolling in the program 17. The largest
decrease occurs for customers that have recently enrolled, during months of high ACDD. The smallest
decrease occurs during mild months for customers that have been enrolled for a long period of time.
In all four models, we consistently find that the sample of prepay customers consume less energy
after enrolling in the prepay program. We also find that that this effect varies with the weather, and that
the effect diminishes over the length of time that the customer is enrolled. In Chapter 7, we will discuss
some of the theoretical and practical implications of these results as well as some of the model’s
limitations.

17

We estimated usage for new users (1st month of prepay) and experienced users (enrolled for 12 month)
in mild months (no degree days, high ACDD months (10ACDD), and high AHDD months (30 AHDD).
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Results
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between prepayment and the
consumption of electricity. Using household level monthly usage data from customers that enroll in a
prepay program, we employ a fixed-effects model to see if there is a change in electricity consumption
after enrollment. The results of our model indicate that prepay customers reduce their consumption by an
average of 11.1% after enrolling in the program. We also find that this response is larger during periods
of high or low temperatures than during mild weather. Furthermore, we find evidence that the
prepayment effect diminishes over the length of time that a customer is enrolled in the program.
In order to understand the significance of an 11.1% decrease in electricity consumption, it’s
useful to give the effect some context. As a comparison, the three investor owned utilities 18 (IOUs) in
KY spent a combined $24.83 million in 2010 on residential DSM. The sole purpose of this expenditure
was to help consumers reduce their electricity consumption, but it’s total impact was only a 0.5% drop in
electricity consumption for the year (Neubauer & Elliott, 2012). Even states that have energy efficiency
requirements typically only require an annual 1-1.5% savings. An oft-cited triumph in behavior-based
conservation is the home energy report issued by the company OPOWER. These reports have been
extensively studied and were found to cause a 2% decrease in consumption, on average (Allcott, 2011).
Even updating state building codes doesn’t achieve the same level of impact as was found with prepay
rates. Comparing homes constructed immediately prior to the change and those constructed immediately
after the change, Jacobsen found that updated building codes in Florida lead to a 4% decrease in
electricity consumption and a 6% decrease in natural gas consumption (Jacobsen & Kotchen, 2011). The
authors understand that all of these programs are unique, and that the results of this analysis may only
apply to a subset of customers. The purpose of these comparisons is simply to demonstrate that an 11.1%
decrease is very large in the world of electricity consumption.
18

Data was unavailable for DSM programs at the RECCs in this report. 2010 is the most recent DSM
data available that is specific to KY.
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Chapter two proposed possible theoretical explanations for why consumption might change
simply by changing the method by which someone is billed. We noted the importance of bounded
rationality and status-quo decision making, and how these limit one’s ability to alter their consumption
pattern. We also pointed out the dichotomy between one’s planner and doer self, and how short term
desires often prevent consumer from making long-term rational decisions. We suggested that prepay
plans could alter this model because of the feedback they provide as well as the constraint they place on
what was perfectly liquid consumption. This study produces strong evidence that suggests that the typical
model for electricity demand is insufficient at explaining these behavioral factors. We do not, however,
produce enough evidence to isolate the specific components that are missing from the model.
While we haven’t determined the exact mechanism that causes the change in electricity
consumption, providing evidence that there is a change is significant. These results add to the existing
literature on the determinants of electricity consumption, giving analysts and planners an additional tool
to model end-use consumption. In the introduction, we mentioned that prepay rates could be used as a
new tool to lower overall residential electricity consumption, similar to DSM programs. In order to
demonstrate that this could be a viable policy option, one would have to produce evidence that the prepay
effect applies to the population as a whole. Due to limitations on the data that were available, our
research, while suggestive, does not meet this standard. However, given that prepay programs are almost
all voluntary, it is useful in the sense that there will always be a self-selection bias for the customers that
choose to enroll in these programs. In other words, it could be argued that utilities that have similar
customer populations and similar program costs could see similar results for the customers that self-select
into their programs.
As with any new program, there are costs and benefits. In the case of prepay programs, the
customers, the utilities, and the wider society are all impacted. In the following section, we will address
the potential costs and benefits to the consumer. We addressed some of the potential costs and benefits to
the utilities in chapter 2. Arguably, prepay and postpay should coexist because each plan has benefits for
different types of customers. A simple analysis of financial records would allow researchers to determine
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how prepay programs impact total sales, total fees collected, and total debt write-offs. With the results of
this analysis, we can assume that the utilities will see a small decrease in total sales, but we do not have
the evidence necessary to address the other issues. Finally, there is a benefit to society in the form of the
emissions reductions. Conserving electricity decreases CO 2 , a greenhouse gas, as well as SO 2 and NO x,
which are known to cause health problems. Appendix A calculates the total saved energy and the total
emissions reductions for 2013 based on the results of this analysis.
7.2 Policy Implications: Consumer Costs
One of the main disputes about the use of prepay rates is how much they actually cost electricity
consumers. Consumer advocates often argue that prepay program fees add up, resulting in higher charges
to consumers who are most sensitive to electricity costs (Garthwaite, 2014; Howat, 2012; Villarreal,
2012). Utilities counter that the programs give consumers the ability to save money by controlling their
electricity usage. They also point out that these consumers can save by avoiding expensive late-payment
fees.
To help resolve the debate, we do a brief analysis of costs from the perspective of the average
consumer in our sample. Based on the mean monthly electricity consumption of 1,597 kWhs, we look at
four different reference cases to estimate a consumer’s postpay annual costs and four scenarios to see how
those costs change after enrolling in a prepay program. Table 7.1 describes those scenarios and equation
7.1 shows how total annual costs are calculated.
Equation 7.1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶19
= (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

+ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓20 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(late fees
+ disconnection fees)

19

For simplicity, we exclude taxes and riders from this calculation. They are a small portion of the
monthly bill and are the same for both types of customers.
20
Only one of the two utilities charges a transaction fee, but we include it to show its impact on total
costs.
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Table 7.1 Cost Scenarios

Reference Case 1
Reference Case 2
Reference Case 3
Reference Case 4
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4

Usage

Late Fees

Disconnects

Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
11.1% Decrease
11.1% Decrease

None
2 months
4 months
6 months
NA
NA
NA
NA

Zero
Zero
One
Two
NA
NA
NA
NA

Payments/
month
NA
NA
NA
NA
1
5
1
5

Table 7.2 Scenario Results: Total annual costs and percent difference
Reference
Case 1

Reference
Case 2

Reference
Case 3

Reference
Case 4

Total Cost

$1,887

$1,904

$1,966

$2,029

Scenario1

$1,960

3.85%

2.92%

-0.33%

-3.38%

Scenario2

$2,030

7.56%

6.60%

3.23%

0.07%

Scenario3

$1,759

-6.82%

-7.66%

-10.57%

-13.31%

Scenario4

$1,834

-2.84%

-3.72%

-6.76%

-9.61%

Table 7.2 shows the total cost results of the four scenarios and how they compare to the four
reference cases. We find that prepay programs save customers money in any scenario in which one
accounts for the 11.1% reduction in demand that we calculated from the empirical analysis. On the other
hand, if you don’t account for any change in usage, it is likely that a consumer’s total electricity costs will
be higher if they are enrolled in a prepay program. This is from the obvious fact that prepay plans add an
additional monthly fee. However, reference cases 3 and 4 show that it is possible that late fees and
disconnection fees can outweigh the prepay program fees. It is also worth noting that transaction fees can
add up to a significant costs when consumers make numerous payments per month. The results of this
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simple analysis demonstrate that the question of costs is more complicated than many make it seem. It
can be the case that consumers save money with prepay, but the opposite can also be true. What is clear
is that regulators should not be quick to dismiss prepay plans for cost reason because they can allow many
cash-constrained customers to save money and avoid debt.
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research
The results of this paper suggest that a customer’s billing method could have an important impact
on their consumption. However, much work remains to be done to get a better understanding of this
relationship. Most importantly, a similar analysis to this one that incorporates descriptive information
about the households would produce results that could be applied to the population as a whole.
Additional studies would also benefit from a customer survey. This would give researchers a better idea
of how and why consumers alter their consumption choices. Finally, to isolate the impact of the rate
structure from the feedback, researchers could conduct a similar analysis that includes a control group of
postpay customers that have access to the same form of feedback as the prepay customers. As electricity
costs continue to rise and the need to reduce consumption continues to grow, these questions will only
become more important in the future.
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Appendix A: Environmental Costs
In order to provide an estimate of the social benefits of emissions reductions, we first estimate the total
saved energy for 2013 based on the total number of prepay customers at Bluegrass Energy and Jackson
Electric, the average consumption for prepay customers, and the estimated reduction in consumption (see
table A.1). Based on these inputs, we estimate that prepay customers at these two coops saved 377
MWhs of electricity that would otherwise have been generated.
A.1 Total Electricity Saved, 2013
Average Electricity Consumption
Monthly
Annual
Total Prepay
(kWh)
(kWh)
Customers
1,597
19,164
1,772 21

Percent
Reduction
11.1%

Saved Electricity
Total Saved Energy Total Saved Electricity
(kWh/year)
(MWh/year)
376,940.55
376.94

We then use the estimated electricity saved to calculate total emissions reductions in terms of CO 2 , SO 2 ,
and NO X . In order to calculate these emissions, we obtain net emissions rates 22 for Eastern Kentucky
Power Cooperative 23 from the EPA Air Markets Program data (EPA Air Markets Program Data, 2013) 24.
Table A.2 shows the total emissions reductions attributed to the saved energy from prepay programs.
A.2 Emissions Reductions
Net Rate
Unit
CO 2
SO 2
NO x

lbs/MWh
2,048.47
2.05
0.92

Emissions
(Rate*Total Saved Electricity)
lbs.
Metric Tons
772,152.2
350.24
774.31
0.351
346.43
0.157

Avoided emissions produce a significant benefit to society. CO 2 is a greenhouse gas, which contributes
to climate change. Meanwhile, reducing SO 2 and NO x produces many health benefits as their
21

Total active prepay customers at Bluegrass Energy and Jackson Electric.
We use net rates because it takes into account the losses from parasitic loads such as scrubbers and
distribution losses.
23
Eastern Kentucky Power is the electricity generator for both co-ops.
24
In Kentucky, this data is collected and maintained by the Energy and Environment Cabinet.
22
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concentration in the air is linked to many illnesses (EPA, 2014). Calculating the exact societal costs and
benefits is beyond the scope of this paper, but we include them in this paper to note their importance.
Refer to the EPA’s most recent Regulatory Impact Analysis for an example of how these pollutants can
be monetized in a benefit/cost analysis (EPA, 2014).
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